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rm heterogeneity and that trade and capital movement
are complements in the sense that trade in goods aects the productivity distribu-
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Recent nancial turmoil reminded us of the importance of the high-quality credit market
on the economy. The subprime loan problem in the United States seriously hurt the nan-
cial systems in the United States and other countries in the world, which led to the global
economic downturn as banks and other nancial intermediaries became cautious and reluc-
tant to lend money that is necessary for rms to smoothly operate. The nancial crisis had
spread very quickly and its impact was large worldwide because the nancial market had
been globalized in the last decades.
The impact of globalization of the nancial market on the economy has been extensively
analyzed.1 Henry (2007), for example, nds evidence that nancial globalization contributes
to economic growth. Klein (2005) shows that countries with better (but not the best) insti-
tutions exhibit positive eects of capital account liberalization on economic growth. Kose,
Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2006) argue that countries that meet threshold conditions (about
institutional quality and trade openness, for example) are better able to reap the growth and
stability benets of nancial globalization. Financial development itself depends on general
institutional quality and political and economic environment. Chinn and Ito (2006) nd
evidence that capital account liberalization leads to equity market development only if a
threshold level of legal development has been attained and that trade openness is a prereq-
uisite for capital account liberalization. Rajan and Zingales (2003) and Do and Levchenko
(2007) nd that trade and international capital movement induce nancial development.
Indeed, the quality of nancial institution has long been recognized to be critical to the
economic prosperity. McKinnon (1973, 1993), for example, emphasizes that less-developed
countries and countries in transition from socialism to democracy should develop reliable
nancial institution in order to achieve economic growth. He argues that countries should
rst improve their internal nancial institutions before opening to trade in goods. Rajan
and Zingales (1998) nd evidence that nancial development contributes positively to the
1Kose, Prasad, Rogo, and Wei (2006, 2009) provide excellent surveys of the studies on the economic
impacts of nancial globalization.
1economic growth.
In this paper, we examine the impacts of international trade in goods as well as the impact
of international capital movement (i.e., capital account liberalization) on the economy when
two countries with dierent qualities of nancial institutions exchange goods and capital.
We are especially interested in the impacts at an industry level and in economic interaction
between trade in goods and capital movement. More specically, we examine how nan-
cial imperfection aects rm heterogeneity within an industry and how international trade
and capital movement aect the industry in individual countries with dierent qualities of
nancial institutions. We also allow countries to dier from each other in their wealth dis-
tributions (which can be considered as capital endowments for now) in order to distinguish
the eects caused by the dierence in countries' nancial development from those caused by
a traditional dierence in factor endowments. We nd that international ows of goods and
capital when countries are dierent in their nancial development are quite dierent from
those when they are dierent in their wealth distributions. More importantly, relationships
between trade and capital movement are quite dierent between these two cases: trade and
capital movement are substitute when countries are dierent in their factor endowments
(Mundell 1957 and Krugman 1979) while they are complements when countries are dierent
in their nancial development. We also investigate foreign direct investment (FDI) ows be-
tween two countries with dierent nancial development, and nd that reciprocal FDI may
arise in such situations. On one hand, FDI from a (relatively) nancially-developed country
(which we call North) to a nancially-less-developed country (which we call South) arises
since Northern rms, which locally nance part of their FDI projects, attempt to exploit
interest rate dierential. On the other hand, there also exists FDI from South to North
aiming to overcome nancial constraints.
In order to show the impacts of trade and capital movement between two countries with
dierent qualities of nancial institutions on the industry in the individual countries, we build
a two-country model in which individuals with dierent wealth become either entrepreneurs
who produce a dierentiated good or lenders. Entrepreneurs would be faced with credit
2constraints if nancial institution is imperfect and if they do not have sucient wealth to
cover the setup costs for the rm. The dierentiated-good industry is under monopolistic
competition such that each rm produces a commodity that is dierentiated from other
commodities produced by other rms. If international trade in goods is allowed, rms will
be faced with absolutely no trade costs, and they compete monopolistically with all other
rms in both domestic and foreign markets. If capital is mobile between the two countries,
there will be no barrier when capital moves across the countries so that some entrepreneurs
may nance the set-up cost through international borrowing.
In this framework, we rst show an important proposition that rms become heteroge-
neous in their productivities only if the country's nancial institution is imperfect. This
paper, therefore, has a signicant contribution to the recent literature on rm heterogeneity
pioneered by Bernard, et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003). Ederington and McCalman (2008,
2009) show that heterogeneous timing of technology adoption causes rm heterogeneity.
Yeaple (2005) considers worker heterogeneity as a source of rm heterogeneity.2 We propose
another source of rm heterogeneity, which is the nancial imperfection. This source is par-
ticularly important because international capital movement, which is critically aected by
international heterogeneity in nancial development, is large in recent decades and capital
movement signicantly aects rm heterogeneity (as we show later). Indeed, Kumar, Rajan,
and Zingales (1999) nd evidence that the average size of rms in industries that depend
on external nance is larger in countries with better nancial markets. They also nd that
institutional development is correlated with lower dispersion in rm size within an industry.
The analysis of this paper predicts that the average productivity is higher and the degree
of rm heterogeneity is lower in nancially developed countries; our analysis provides a the-
oretical background for these important empirical ndings about the relationship between
institutional quality and rm size.
2Bustos (2005), Atkeson and Burnstein (2010), and Constantini and Melitz (2007) allow rms to up-
grade their production technologies with a xed amount of investment, and show that inherently productive
rms have more incentives than others to upgrade their technology and engage in the export. Furusawa
and Sato (2008) demonstrate that rms with inherently dierent productivities choose dierent production
technologies with dierent factor intensities.
3Chaney (2005), Manova (2008a), and Suwantaradon (2008) also develop their models in
which heterogeneous rms are faced with credit-constraints when they nance trade costs.
Their models predict that more-productive and wealthier rms engage in export, while other
sell their products only domestically.3 Our model is quite dierent from theirs in that -
nancial imperfection leads to rm heterogeneity in not just their attitudes toward exporting
but their productivities themselves (which of course aect export activities). We also inves-
tigate the impact of international trade and capital movement and their interactions under
nancial imperfection. Foellmi and Oechslin (2009) also theoretically investigate the eect
of international trade on exogenously-heterogeneous rms within an industry and show that
rich entrepreneurs wins while poor ones lose from opening to trade.
There also exists the literature on the eect of nancial imperfection on the trade struc-
ture and trade policies. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), Beck (2002), Matsuyama (2005),
Wynne (2005), Ju and Wei (2008), and Antr as and Caballero (2009) argue that the cross-
country dierences in the quality of nancial institutions signicantly aect the structure
of countries' comparative advantage and trade patterns. Antr as and Caballero (2009) also
theoretically examine the complementarity between international trade in goods and capital
movement under nancial imperfection. They show among others that trade in goods and
capital movement are complements in the sense that trade in goods induces capital to ow
into a nancially-less-developed country (i.e., South). This result is in a stark contrast to
a typical result in the traditional literature that trade in goods and international capital
movement are substitutes (Mundell 1957).
We also nd that trade in goods and capital movement are complement under imperfect
nancial institution. But we nd that trade in goods induces capital to ow out of South.
Antr as and Caballero (2009) nd the complementarity between trade and capital inow
from the perspective of South in a general equilibrium model with nancial friction. The
key to this complementarity is that trade induces South to specialize to the nancially-
unconstrained industry so that labor employed disproportionately in that sector depresses
3Manova (2008b) and Chor and Manova (2009) nd evidence that credit constraints are an important
determinant of international trade ows.
4(compared to North) the wage rate in South and raises the rental rate of capital that is mobile
across countries. This traditional, general-equilibrium mechanism of specialization causes
the complementarity between trade and capital inow (to South). Trade and capital outow
(from South) are complements in our model, on the other hand, because trade benets
Northern rms and harms Southern rms (the positive market expansion eect outweighs
the negative competition enhancement eect for Northern rms but not for Southern rms)
so that trade pushes up the Northern interest rate (or rental rate) but pushes down the
Southern interest rate. That is, the key to our complementarity is the competition eect in
the industry. Our competition eect is relevant and important especially for trade between
similar countries because the proportion of intra-industry trade to inter-industry trade tends
to be higher in trade between similar countries.4 In addition, our analysis applies better to
trade among developed countries and emerging-market economies since they tend to trade
manufactures whose production operation depends on external nance.
After setting out the model in the next section, we briey examine trade equilibrium when
nancial institution is perfect, and conrm that trade and capital movement are (almost)
perfect substitutes. Section 4, which is the main section of the paper, examines the economy
under imperfect nancial institution. We rst show that rms are heterogeneous in their
productivities only if the country's nancial institution is imperfect. Then we show that
trade in goods alone will not aect the productivity distribution of the industry in either
country, but capital movement makes a signicant impact on the industry, i.e., capital ight
from South to North, which is known as Lucas Paradox (Lucas 1990), arises if the dierence
in the nancial institution is signicant, for example. Finally in this section, we show that
trade induces capital movement from South to North, aecting the productivity distribution
of the industry in both countries; trade aects the productivity distribution only when it is
accompanied by international capital movement. Section 5 considers the possibility of FDI.
We nd that reciprocal FDI (FDI from South to North as well as FDI from North to South)
arises under nancial imperfection. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst to present a
4Our result can be considered to be in contrast to Krugman's (1979) substitutability result, just as Antr as
and Caballero's (2009) complementarity is in contrast to Mundell's (1957) substitutability result.
5theoretical framework in which nancial imperfection induces reciprocal FDI.
2 Model
There are two countries, which we call North (N) and South (S). In country k 2 fN;Sg,
there is a mass mk of individuals, each owning one unit of labor and a wealth of ! that
is uniformly distributed on [0;  !k]; thus the density of individuals whose wealth is ! 2
[0;  !k] equals mk= !k.5 All individuals share the same utility function over the two goods, a
dierentiated good X and a numeraire good Y , which is characterized by











;  > 1; (1)
denotes the subutility derived from the consumption of continuum varieties of good X,
fx(i)gi2
k (where 
k denotes the set of all varieties available in country k), and y denotes
the consumption of good Y . The numeraire good is competitively produced such that one
unit of labor produces one unit of the good, so the wage rate equals one.
Each individual chooses a consumption prole of good X to maximize ux subject to
R

k p(i)x(i)di  E, where p(i) and E denote the price for variety i and the total expenditure








1  denotes the price index of good X. We substitute this result
into (1) to obtain ux = E=Pk. Therefore, an individual's utility function can be written as
u = logE logPk+y. Maximizing the utility with the constraint E+y  I, where I denote
the individual's income (which is the sum of her labor income and the investment return
from her wealth), we obtain E = 1. That is, each individual spends E = 1 on good X, so
the country k's aggregate expenditure on good X is mk.
5We assume this particular probability distribution of the wealth only for concreteness. We can eas-
ily extend our model to one with a general wealth distribution with a continuous cumulative distribution
function.
6The dierentiated-good industry is characterized by the monopolistic competition with
free-entry and free-exit. When a rm enters, however, it incurs an R&D (or setup) invest-
ment. R&D and production costs are the cost of labor for those operations. We assume that
there are two types of production technology (or facility). The higher the investment, the
lower is the marginal cost of production. More specically, if a rm invests gh (gl) units of
the numeraire good, its marginal cost becomes 1='h (1='l). We assume that gl < gh   !k,
'l  ', and 'l < 'h  ', where  > 1 represents the productivity gap.6 To obtain the










Since there is a continuum of varieties, each rm naturally ignores the impact of its pricing on
the price index, so that rms select prices that are =( 1) times their individual marginal
costs. It is easy to see that the prots for rm i in country k equal








Individuals in country k decide whether or not they become entrepreneurs who can borrow
money at a gross interest rate of Rk to nance their investments if necessary. If an individual
decides to become an entrepreneur, she will choose either the high-productivity technology
or the low-productivity technology with which her rm operates. If she decides not to be an
entrepreneur or if part of her wealth is left after the investment for her rm, she will lend
out her (remaining) wealth.
The critical feature of the model is that entrepreneurs are faced with a nancial constraint.
We assume that entrepreneurs in country k can only pledge themselves to repay only a
fraction k 2 (0;1] of the prots that they will earn, and hence entrepreneur i in country k
can borrow only up to the amount such that the repayment does not exceed kk('(i); ~ 'k).
The fraction k represents the quality of the nancial institution of the country. (Matsuyama
2000 adopts this formulation of nancial imperfection.7) A nancial institution is perfect
6We can relax the assumption that  !k  gh at the cost of complicating the exposition of the analysis.
7Matsuyama (2007) describes various economic implications of the credit market imperfection of this
type.
7if k = 1; any entrepreneur with any amount of wealth can nance the investment for
either high-productivity technology or low-productivity technology, eectively without any
constraint. A nancial institution is imperfect if k < 1; individuals with small amounts of
wealth may not be able to nance the investment in this case.
We can list several reasons why  (from which we drop the subscript k for the following
general argument) can be smaller than one. A natural cause of nancial imperfection is the
imperfection of legal enforcement.8 If the legal enforcement is perfect, as assumed in the
traditional literature, a court can enforce a borrowing contract as long as the repayment
under the contract does not exceed the prot from the project, denoted by . Empirical
evidences show, however, the enforcement power is not perfect (La Porta, et al., 1998).
Thus, in reality, a court may be able to force a borrower to pay only up to a fraction of
the prots, i.e.,  where  < 1, even though the realized prot is . Hence, unless the
non-pecuniary penalty on the default is large enough, the borrower is likely to refuse to
pay more than  even if the promised payment exceeds this amount. This behavior is
called the \strategic default." A contract cannot be a perfect commitment device if the legal
enforcement is imperfect; it is dicult for a lender to expect that a borrower will sincerely
make the promised payment. Given that, lenders will not lend more than the amount such
that the return from the lending equals . Another cause of nancial imperfection is the
agency problem of the lender-borrower relationship, which is explained briey in a simple
model in the Appendix.
In the economy that we consider, there are two types of the constraints that must be sat-
ised: the protability constraints and borrowing constraints. The protability constraints
k('h; ~ 'k)   Rkgh  0; (4)
k('l; ~ 'k)   Rkgl  0; (5)
for the high-productivity rm and the low-productivity rm, respectively, simply mean that
the net prots must be non-negative if rms of the respective type operate at all. The
8See for example Hart(1995).
8borrowing constraints, on the other hand, can be written as
kk('h; ~ 'k)  Rk(gh   !); (6)
kk('l; ~ 'k)  Rk(gl   !); (7)
which mean that in country k, an entrepreneur with the wealth of ! can borrow money only
up to the amount such that the repayment does not exceed the fraction k of the prots.
It is easy to see that for each type of the rm, the protability constraint is tighter than
the borrowing constraint if k is large, whereas the borrowing constraint is tighter if k is
small. The borrowing constraint tends to be tighter for entrepreneurs with a small amount
of wealth.
We investigate the eects of trade and international capital movement under an imper-
fect nancial institution on the economy (mainly on the productivity distribution of the
dierentiated-good industry). But before that, we briey analyze the benchmark case in
which the nancial institution is perfect. For the rest of the analysis, we assume that North
is (weakly) capital-abundant (i.e.,  !N   !S) and North has a (weakly) better nancial
institution than South (i.e., N  S).
We also emphasize here that the numeraire good is always tradable in all cases that we
consider, so \opening to trade in goods" here means opening to trade in the dierentiated
good as well as the numeraire good. We need this assumption in order to meaningfully
analyze the eect of capital movement. Due to the static nature of our model, some goods
must be traded for capital to ow from one country to the other from the balance-of-payment
requirement.
3 Equilibrium under a perfect nancial institution
This section shows that if there is no nancial constraint, all entrepreneurs choose the same
production technology and hence all rms in the dierentiated-good sector become homo-
geneous. Moreover, trade in goods and international capital movement are shown to be
substitutes in a sense that is made clear shortly.
9Consider a decision made by an individual with the wealth !. If she invests gh on the
high-productivity technology, she would obtain k('h; ~ 'k)   Rk(gh   !). If ! < gh, she
borrows gh   ! to earn k('h; ~ 'k) and pay Rk(gh   !) back to the lenders. If !  gh, on
the other hand, she obtains k('h; ~ 'k) from the production of good X (from the investment
of gh) and  Rk(gh   !) from lending out.9 Similarly, if she invests gl, she would obtain
k('l)   R(gl   !). Finally, if she lends out the entire wealth of hers, she would get Rk!.
An entrepreneur chooses the high-productivity technology rather than the low-productivity
technology if
k('h; ~ 'k)   Rk(gh   !) > k('l; ~ 'k)   Rk(gl   !);
which can be written as
(1   
1 )k('h; ~ 'k) > Rk(gh   gl): (8)
Note that this inequality does not depend on !, so all entrepreneurs choose the same tech-
nology.
Whether or not the inequality (8) holds depends on the productivity and investment-cost
parameters. In this paper, we assume that (8) holds so that all entrepreneurs choose the
high-productivity technology if they are not nancially constrained.10 In equilibrium, some
individuals become entrepreneurs while some others must be lending money to them, and
hence the net benet of being an entrepreneur and that of lending money must be the same.
That is,
k('h; ~ 'k)   Rk(gh   !) = Rk!;
which is reduced to
k('h; ~ 'k) = Rkgh: (9)
Note that this equality simply shows that the net prots for high-tech rms are zero: running
a business does not yield extra benets to individuals.
Now, substituting this equality into (8) and rearranging terms, we obtain  1 > gh=gl,
which we assume for the rest of our analysis.
9We assume that every individual runs at most one rm.




This assumption indicates that the productivity gap is so large that the more-costly high-
productivity technology is eectively more economical than the low-productivity technology.
Consequently, all entrepreneurs choose the high-productivity technology while some indi-
viduals lend their wealth to those entrepreneurs. Moreover, it is easy to check that under
this assumption, there does not exist equilibrium in which entrepreneurs choose the low-
productivity technology.
Proposition 1 Under a perfect nancial institution, all entrepreneurs in the dierentiated-
good sector choose the same production technology upon entry, and hence rms are homoge-
neous within the sector.
3.1 Autarkic Equilibrium
In this subsection, we derive the autarkic equilibrium in some details. To this end, we rst
investigate the credit market. Let nk denote the mass of rms (or equivalently the mass
of entrepreneurs) in country k in equilibrium. Then, the total credit demands equal nkgh,














We need the following assumption to ensure that nk < mk.
Assumption 2
 !k < 2gh:
11Recall that the decision as to whether or not an individual becomes an entrepreneur does
not depend on her wealth. This means that despite that the number of entrepreneurs is
unambiguously determined, who become entrepreneurs is indeterminate. But if we suppose



















In this case, individuals become entrepreneurs if and only if their wealth levels lie in the
interval [!
h;k;  !k].
To obtain the equilibrium prots and interest rate, we calculate the autarkic competition
index ~ 'A























In autarky, we have N('h; ~ 'A
N)  S('h; ~ 'A
S) due to  !N   !S; prots in capital-abundant
North are (weakly) smaller than those in South since there are more rms per capita in





In autarky, we have RN  RS because  !N   !S; the interest rate in capital-abundant North
is smaller than that in South.
3.2 Free Trade in Goods and Capital Movement
Under a perfect nancial institution, the protability constraint for high-tech rms is binding
in equilibrium as (9) shows. This binding protability constraint is a key to deriving the
substitutability between trade in goods and capital movement.
12In free trade, all rms compete in a level eld regardless of their nationality, so the left-
hand side of (9) equals W('h; ~ 'T) for every rm, where ~ 'T = '(nN + nS)
1
 1 denotes the









represents a rm's prots. Then, it follows directly from (9) that RN = RS. Free trade
in goods equalizes the interest rates between the two countries as the interest rate reects
rms' prots which are equalized as a result of free trade. Trade in goods is a substitute of
capital movement as it eliminates an interest rate dierential.
If capital is mobile between the two countries, on the other hand, the interest rates are
equalized (i.e., RN = RS) and hence N('h; ~ 'N) = S('h; ~ 'S) as (9) indicates. Moreover,
we show in the Appendix that N('h; ~ 'N) = S('h; ~ 'S) = W('h; ~ 'T). That is, capital
movement is a substitute of trade for the rms as they earn the same prots in these two
regimes.
It is interesting that the equilibrium prots under capital movement are the same as
those under free trade in goods. Trade in goods eectively expands the market for Northern
rms and shrinks the market for Southern rms, which increases Northern rms' prots and
decreases Southern rms'. Capital movement (without trade), on the other hand, decreases
the number of Northern rms while increases the number of Southern rms, and thereby
changes their prots accordingly. Trade induces a net ow of the good from North to South,
while capital movement induces a ow of rms themselves from North to South. Northern
rms' prots increase while Southern rms' prots decrease as a result.
Proposition 2 Under a perfect nancial institution, trade in goods and international capi-
tal movement are perfect substitutes in the sense that (i) trade will equalize the two countries'
interest rates, eliminating an incentive for capital to move internationally, (ii) capital move-
ment will also equalize the interest rate at the same level as the equilibrium interest rate in
free trade, and (iii) the prots are equalized between the two countries at a common level in
either of the two regimes.
13Although some important economic variables, such as the prots and interest rates, are
the same between the two regimes, consumers can enjoy more varieties in the case of free
trade in goods than in the case of free capital mobility, as trade allows consumers in either
country to consume varieties produced in the foreign country as well as those produced in
the home country. Trade in goods and capital movement are perfect substitutes from the
perspective of the production side of the economy. But trade in goods is a better alternative
than capital movement when the consumption side is taken into account.
4 Financial Imperfection and Firm Heterogeneity
We have shown that under a perfect nancial institution, an individual's wealth is irrelevant
in her decision as to whether or not she becomes an entrepreneur. As expected, individual's
wealth will be an important factor under nancial imperfection. Due to a nancial constraint,
only wealthy individuals can borrow money to nance a project. Moreover, since individuals
are heterogeneous in their wealth, their choice of technology may also be heterogeneous
leading to the rm heterogeneity in productivity.
For the rest of the analysis, we focus on the case in which  is small such that the
borrowing constraints, (6) and (7), hold with equality while protability constraints, (4)
and (5), hold with strict inequalities. Thus, the relevant constraints are the borrowing
constraints, (6) and (7). If k is small enough that the borrowing constraint for either type is
binding, wealthiest individuals become entrepreneurs with the high-productivity technology,
those who own intermediate levels of wealth become entrepreneurs with the low-productivity
technology, and the poorest individuals lend out their wealth.
We dene critical levels of wealth, !h;k and !l;k, such that all individuals with ! 2
[!h;k;  !k] become entrepreneurs choosing the high-productivity technology while all individ-
uals with ! 2 [!l;k;!h;k) become entrepreneurs choosing the low-productivity technology.
A condition that !h;k and !l;k must satisfy is the credit-market clearing condition. In
autarky, it is written as
mk
 !k
( !k   !h;k)gh +
mk
 !k




14which can be solved for !l;k to dene the function ^ !l;k:
^ !l;k(!h;k) =







This function represents the relationship between !l;k and !h;k under the credit-market
clearing condition. We can easily see that ^ !l;k is a decreasing function and that !h;k  
^ !l;k(!h;k) increases with !h;k. An increase in !h;k releases part of capital used for the high-
tech rms, which is absorbed by the low-tech entrants whose mass exceeds that of the exiting
high-tech rms.
4.1 Autarkic Equilibrium
We use (15) to write prots for rms as functions of !h;k. In this case of autarky, the
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 1  !k   !h;k
 !k
+
!h;k   ^ !l;k(!h;k)
 !k
: (16)
The competition index ~ 'k(!h;k) is decreasing in !h;k as the derivative of the normalized
average productivity k(!h;k) with respect to !h equals [(gh=gl)    1]  !k, which is negative
under Assumption 1; the eect of the contraction of the high-tech group (i.e., an increase in
!h;k) outweighs the eect of the expansion of the entire mass of rms. The prots for the
rms can be written as















for the high-tech and low-tech rms, respectively. Since k(!h;k) decreases with !h;k, both
k('h; ~ 'k(!h;k)) and k('l; ~ 'k(!h;k)) increase with !h;k.11
11Note that the population mk is irrelevant for rms' prots. A rise in population is good news for a
rm as its market expands, but is also bad news as the number of rms increases. These two eects are
completely oset against each other in this environment.
15Now, we are ready to determine equilibrium levels of !h;k, !l;k, and Rk. The binding










k(!h;k)[gl   ^ !l;k(!h;k)]
: (20)
It immediately follows from (19) and (20) that !A





gl   ^ !l;k(!A
h;k)
: (21)
This condition reveals that the ratio of the maximum amount of borrowing by high-tech
rms and that of low-tech rms must be the same as the prot gap between the rms of the
two types.
The Appendix (Proof of Proposition 3) shows that the following assumption ensures that
(21) determines !A
h;k such that !A
h;k   ^ !l;k(!A









Figure 1 depicts the feasible set of  !k as the interval [gh;  !0
k). As the gure suggests, to
guarantee that the feasible set of  !k to be nonempty, we need to have gh=2 > ( 1gl  







With Assumption 4, we can nd  !k that satises Assumption 3. For such a  !k, we have
^ !l;k(!A
h;k) < !A
h;k and hence the following proposition.
16Proposition 3 Firm heterogeneity within the dierentiated-good sector arises under a poor
nancial institution.
Under a perfect nancial institution, entrepreneurs can freely borrow money (if necessary)
to nance the most-ecient production technology. Under an imperfect nancial institution,
however, their initial wealth levels become important. Due to the borrowing constraint, only
wealthiest individuals can aord the most-ecient and most-expensive production technol-
ogy; other entrepreneurs must be content with the less-ecient but less-expensive production
technology. Firm heterogeneity arises only if the nancial institution is imperfect.
Note that equation (21) does not involve k. As long as k is small so that the borrowing
constraints are binding for both high-tech and low-tech rms, the productivity distribution
of the industry is not aected by a change in the quality of the nancial institution; it
is the credit-market equilibrium that determines the productivity distribution. With the
productivity distribution given by (21), the interest rate RA
k is determined by the borrowing









As (22) indicates, any change in k will induce osetting change in Rk. In partial equilibrium
analyses, nancial development generally induces rms to enter the market or to upgrade
their production technologies, because it becomes easier for entrepreneurs to nance the
investment costs. But this seemingly obvious causality breaks down in this general equi-
librium model. The productivity distribution of the industry hinges critically on the total
credit supply that is xed in the autarkic economy. That is why nancial development would
increase the interest rate to oset an induced increase in credit demands.
Lemma 1 Under nancial imperfection (such that both borrowing constraints, (6) and (7),
are binding), nancial development would only raise the interest rate, leaving the size and
the productivity distribution of the industry unchanged.
An increase in the wealth level of the wealthiest individuals, on the other hand, will
change the productivity distribution of the industry such that it increases the normalized
17average productivity. It follows directly from (15) and (21) that a rise in  !k will decrease
both !h;k and ^ !l;k(!h;k), which unambiguously lower !h;k= !k and ^ !l;k(!h;k)= !k. Then, it is
readily seen from (16) that k(!h;k) increases as a consequence.
The impact of a rise in  !k on the mass of rms of each type can also be seen readily. It
is easy to see that a rise in  !k increases the total mass of rms, (mk= !k)[ !k   ^ !l;k(!h;k)] =
mk[1   (^ !l;k(!h;k)= !k)]. The mass of high-tech rms increases as (mk= !k)( !k   !h;k) =
mk[1   (!h;k= !k)] rises when !h;k= !k falls. As we can see from (21), on the other hand,
^ !l;k(!h;k) decreases when !h;k falls at a smaller rate. Thus, !h;k   ^ !l;k(!h;k) decreases when
!h;k falls in response to an increase in  !k. As a consequence, the mass of low-tech rms,
(mk= !k)[!h;k   ^ !l;k(!h;k)] falls if  !k increases.
Applying this argument to the case of the two countries when they have dierent wealth
distributions such that  !N >  !S, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose  !N >  !S. In autarky, there are more rms in North than in South.
There are more high-tech rms in North than in South, while there are less low-tech rms
in North than in South. Northern market is more competitive than Southern as indicated by
the fact that the normalized average productivity is higher in North.
It follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 that (i) RA
N < RA
S if N = S and  !N >  !S, and (ii)
RA
N > RA
S if N > S and  !N =  !S. In a general case where N  S and !N  !S, which of
RA
N and RA
S is greater than the other depends on whether or not the dierence in the quality
of the nancial institutions between the two countries is more signicant than the dierence
in the wealth levels.
Proposition 4 In autarky, the interest rate is higher in North than in South if the dierence
in the quality of the nancial institution between North and South is more signicant than
the dierence in the wealth levels.
4.2 Equilibrium with Free Trade in Goods
In this subsection, we show that opening to trade induces intra-industry trade so that con-
sumers enjoy an increase in variety of the good, but it does not aect the productivity
18distribution of the industry in either country. Trade in goods, however, generally narrows
the gap between the countries' interest rates.
To see how the prots for rms change with trade, we calculate the competition index,















































































W(!h;N;!h;S)[gl   ^ !l;k(!h;k)]
: (28)
The equilibrium values of !h;k and Rk, which we call as !T
h;k and RT
k, satisfy the two equations

















19which are directly derived from (27) and (28).
Since equation (29) is identical to the one in (21), we nd that the critical levels of





opening to trade will not change the productivity distribution. The borrowing constraints
require the ratio of the maximum borrowing of the high-tech and low-tech rms to remain
the same before and after opening to trade, as indicated by (29). In addition, capital supply
is inelastic, so the productivity distribution of the industry will not change with trade.
Proposition 5 Under nancial imperfection, international trade in goods between two coun-
tries will not aect the productivity distribution of the industry in either country.
International trade in goods, however, aects the interest rates in general through its
eects on rms' prots. We investigate the impacts of trade on prots and interest rates
separately in the case where the countries are dierent in their wealth levels (N = S and
 !N >  !S) and in the case where they are dierent in nancial development (N > S and
 !N =  !S).
4.2.1 Interest rates when N = S and  !N >  !S
In this case, Northern market is more competitive than Southern market in autarky, so
opening to trade will increase Northern rms' prots and decrease Southern rms' as they
earn the same prots in free trade. Consequently, the interest rate increases in North and
decreases in South.















and hence N('h; ~ 'A
N) < W('h; ~ 'T
W) < S('h; ~ 'A
S) as (17), (18), (25), and (26) indicate.
That is, trade will increase Northern rms' prots while decrease Southern rms' prots.





S as the comparison between (22) and (30) also reveals. We also nd
20that the interest rate is still lower in North than in South, i.e., RT
N < RT
S. It follows from
!A
h;N < !A
h;S when  !N >  !S and !T
h;k = !A
h;k for k = N;S that gh   !T
h;N > gh   !T
h;S. Then,
since N = S, (30) implies that RT
N < RT
S.
The interest rate is lower in North than in South in autarky, reecting the dierence in
their wealth levels. The gap between them narrows, although not completely, as a result of
trade.
4.2.2 Interest rates when N > S and  !N =  !S
In this case, the normalized average productivities are the same between the two countries in
autarky, and so are the prots for the rms of each type. The autarkic interest rate is higher
in North than in South, reecting the dierence in the quality of the nancial institutions. As
seen from (24), the rms' prots are the same between the two countries in autarky, and so are
the prots in free trade; the market expansion eect of trade liberalization completely osets
the competition enhancement eect. Consequently, the rms' prots and also the individual
interest rates of the two countries will not change as a result of trade. To be more precise,
we compare the normalized average productivities before and after the trade liberalization




h;S) and that N('h; ~ 'A
N) = W('h; ~ 'T
W) =
S('h; ~ 'A





4.3 Equilibrium with International Capital Movement
As Proposition 4 indicates, whether or not North has a higher interest rate than South
depends on whether or not the dierence in the quality of the nancial institution between
the two countries is more signicant than the dierence in the wealth levels. If capital is
allowed to move internationally, it moves from the country with a lower interest rate to
the country with a higher interest rate, shrinking the industry in the former country and
expanding the industry in the latter.
To see the impacts of capital movement more closely, we rst derive the equilibrium
competition index for each country. Let us dene the amount of capital that moves from
North to South by K (which takes a negative value when capital moves from South to North).
21Then, the credit-market clearing condition in North can be written as
mN
 !N
( !N   !h;N)gh +
mN
 !N




which is solved for !l;N to obtain the threshold wealth level for the low-tech rms in North
as
^ !l;N(!h;N;K) =







with slight abuse of notation. Similarly, the threshold wealth level for the low-tech rms in
South can be written as
^ !l;S(!h;S;K) =































 1  !k   !h;k
 !k
+
!h;k   ^ !l;k(!h;k;K)
 !k
:
It follows from (32) that prots for high-tech and low-tech rms in country k are written
as

































k(!h;k;K)[gl   ^ !l;k(!h;k;K)]
;
respectively.
22As a consequence of international capital movement, interest rates RN and RS are equal-
ized at a level, which we call RW. The equilibrium values of K, RW, and !h;k for k = N;S,
which we call KK, RK
W, and !K

























The eects of capital movement on the industry are very dierent from those of trade
in goods. Capital movement, induced by the dierence in nancial development and the
dierence in wealth levels, will change the productivity distribution and other characteristics
of the industry. To see these eects, we examine the two cases separately again.
4.3.1 Eects of capital movement when N = S and  !N >  !S
As we have seen in the above, the normalized average productivity is higher in North than
in South in autarky, i.e., N(!A
h;N) > S(!A
h;S), so rms' prots are smaller in North. Con-
sequently, the interest rate is lower in North than in South. If capital is allowed to move
internationally, therefore, capital ows out of North to South, which shrinks Northern indus-
try (i.e., both !h;N and !l;N increase) and expand Southern industry (i.e., both !h;S and !l;S
decrease). As a result, the normalized average productivity decreases in North and increases
in South to their individual equilibrium values.
















h;N < gh   !K
h;S. Suppose on the contrary that gh   !K




h;S. Then, it follows from (33) and (34) that ^ !l;N(!K
h;N;KK) < ^ !l;S(!K
h;S;KK) and
hence !K
h;N= !N < !K
h;S= !S and ^ !l;N(!K
h;N;KK)= !N < ^ !l;S(!K
h;S;KK)= !S, which in turn imply
N(!K
h;N;KK) > S(!K
h;S;KK) as we have seen in the case of autarky. But then (36) would
23be violated, so we must have gh !K
h;N < gh !K




Capital movement from capital-abundant North shrinks Northern industry and expands
Southern industry. This change can be considered as large because Northern thresholds
of wealth, !h;N and !l;N, are smaller than Southern counterparts, !h;S and !l;S, in au-
tarky, but are greater now in the case where capital is allowed to move internationally; the
poorest entrepreneurs who adopt the high-productivity technology and low-productivity, re-
spectively, must be richer now in North than in South. Note, however, that N(!K
h;N;KK) >
S(!K
h;S;KK) so that Northern rms still earn less prots than Southern rms in equilibrium
as there are more rich entrepreneurs in North than in South. As Northern rms' prof-
its increase while Southern rms' prots decrease, the interest rate increases in North and
decreases in South to the common rate RK
W.
Proposition 6 When the two countries dier in their wealth levels, capital moves from
capital-abundant North to capital-scarce South, shrinking the industry in North and expand-
ing the industry in South. Northern market is still more competitive than Southern in equi-
librium with capital movement, so Northern rms earn smaller prots than Southern rms.
4.3.2 Eects of capital movement when N > S and  !N =  !S
The normalized average productivities are the same between the two countries in autarky
due to  !N =  !S, so the fact that N > S leads to RA
N > RA
S. Consequently, capital ight
from South occurs if capital is allowed to move internationally.


















h;S;KK): the normalized average productivity is higher in North than
in South also in this case.
Proposition 7 When the two countries dier in the quality of the nancial institution,
24capital moves from South with the relatively poor nancial institution to North, shrinking
the industry in South and expanding the industry in North.
4.4 Equilibrium with Trade in Goods and Capital Movement
We have seen that the normalized average productivity is higher in North than in South even
in the equilibrium with international capital movement. Thus, if trade is allowed (in addition
to capital movement) so that all rms compete in a level eld, Northern rms' prots rise
while Southern rms' prots fall, which will induce further capital movement from South to
North.
To see this more formally, we rst note that the formula for the competition index is the
same as in the case where only trade is allowed, i.e., the formula given in (23), since capital
movement simply relocate the rms from one country to the other without aecting the total
number of rms of each type for given !h;N and !h;S. Thus, the borrowing constraints for
















When trade in goods is allowed in addition to capital movement, the normalized average
productivity that faces Northern rms decrease from N(!K
h;N;KK) and the one that faces
Southern rms increase from S(!K
h;S;KK) to W(!h;N;!h;S;KKT), where KKT represents
the equilibrium capital ow from North to South. Induced changes in prots will tend to
increase the interest rate in North and decrease the interest rate in South. Capital moves
from South to North to counter these movements in order to keep the interest rate parity
between the two countries.
Proposition 8 Trade in goods and capital movement are complement such that trade in
goods induces further capital movement when capital has been mobile internationally. Trade
25induces capital ight from South, expanding Northern industry and shrinking Southern.
International capital movement alone is not sucient to equalize rms' prots between North
and South; the market in the capital-abundant or nancially-developed North is more com-
petitive than the one in the South. Opening to trade allows Northern rms to penetrate
less-competitive Southern market and induces Southern rms to penetrate more-competitive
Northern market, raising Northern rms' prots while lowering Southern rms'. That is why
opening to trade when capital has been internationally mobile induces additional capital
movement from South to North. Proposition 8, which expresses this complementarity of
trade and capital movement, is a core result of the paper.
4.4.1 Eects of trade and capital movement when N = S and  !N >  !S
It follows from (38) and RN = RS that !KT
h;N = !KT
h;S and consequently !KT
l;N = !KT
l;S . Note that
although the threshold wealth levels are the same between the two countries, the ratio of the
mass of high-tech rms to the mass of low-tech rms is higher in North than in South due
to  !N >  !S. Moreover, despite that trade induces a capital ight from South when capital
has been mobile between the countries, capital is relocated from capital-abundant North to
South relative to the autarky. Figure 2(a) shows the equilibrium thresholds between high-
tech and low-tech entrepreneurs, i.e., !h;k, in the four scenarios that we have considered. The
arrows there indicate the movement of the threshold when the regime changes from autarky
(or free trade) to free capital movement, and from free capital movement to trade and
capital movement. Note again that trade will change the threshold only when accompanied
by capital movement. The change in the threshold for being an entrepreneur, i.e., !l;k, is
similar, so it is not depicted in the gure for clarity.
4.4.2 Eects of trade and capital movement when N > S and  !N =  !S









26Comparing this condition to the one in the case where only capital is allowed to move, i.e.,





h;S. This, of course, is consistent with our observation
that trade (in addition to capital movement) induces further capital movement from South
to North. Figure 2(b) shows the thresholds for the choice of technology. Again, it shows
that trade changes the productivity distribution of the industry only when accompanied by
capital movement.
5 Foreign Direct Investment under Financial Imper-
fection
We have shown how nancial imperfection aects international capital movement and the
resulting adjustment of the industry. The type of capital movement that we have considered
is portfolio investment such that capital moves to the country in which borrowers utilize the
capital to establish their rms. In this section, we consider foreign direct investment (FDI)
such that it is entrepreneurs that move from one country to the other where they borrow
money and invest to produce the good.12
FDI naturally arises if trade is prohibited. In such cases, entrepreneurs in the country
with a competitive market have an incentive to locate their rms in the foreign country with
a less-competitive market. Here, we consider a situation in which such incentives do not
exist. We consider a free-trade situation in which prots are the same for all rms regardless
of their locations. To derive a sharp result, we also assume that  !N =  !S. We show that
even in such situations, some rms engage in FDI. Indeed, we nd that there co-exist two
types of FDI in equilibrium: one that rms engage in FDI to exploit interest rate dierential
between the two countries, and the other that rms invest in the foreign country to overcome
their borrowing constraints. Under nancial imperfection, reciprocal FDI arises: Northern
rms invest in South to exploit interest rate dierential whereas Southern rms invest in
12Since we assume that goods are freely traded in this section, whether entrepreneurs themselves move
from the FDI source country to the host country or only their operations are relocated does not qualitatively
aect the results.
27North to overcome borrowing constraints.
Recall that in free trade, the interest rate is higher in North than in South, i.e., RN > RS,
reecting the dierence in nancial development between the two countries, i.e., N > S. If
FDI is allowed, therefore, some rms in North invest in South, nancing the investment at
smaller costs. Consequently, the interest rate tends to decrease in North and rise in South,
such that they become equal at the world interest rate, RW in equilibrium with trade and
FDI. Faced with the same interest rate, some Southern individuals are credit-constrained
in the South, but not in North, since the borrowing constraint is tighter in South; we have
!h;N < !h;S and !l;N < !l;S, and hence Southern individuals with ! 2 [!l;N;!l;S)[[!h;N;!h;S)
will invest in North to overcome their borrowing constraint for either becoming entrepreneurs
or upgrading production technology.
To derive the equilibrium with trade and FDI, let K(!) denote the amount of capital
that moves from North to South as FDI by entrepreneurs with the wealth !; the entire
FDI ows are characterized by fK(!)g!2[0; !N], which will be written henceforth simply as
fK(!)g. (Note that we have used the supposition that  !S =  !N in this denition of K.)
In equilibrium, the borrowing constraints must be binding for both high-tech and low-tech
















As in the case of trade and capital movement in the previous section, we have from (39)










h;k represents the threshold for high-tech rms in equilibrium with trade and FDI.
This condition immediately gives us !TD
h;N < !TD
h;S as Figure 3 depicts. Figure 3 also shows
28that !TD
l;N < !TD







gl   ^ !l;k(!TD
h;k ;fK(!)g)
; (41)
which in turn is derived from (39) and (40).
As indicated in Figure 3, some (and not necessarily all) Northern entrepreneurs with ! 2
[!TD
l;S ;gl)[[!TD
h;S;gh) move to South, contributing to the interest rate parity between the two
countries. At the same time, all Southern entrepreneurs with ! 2 [!TD
l;N ;!TD
l;S ) [ [!TD
h;N;!TD
h;S)
move to North; those with ! 2 [!TD
l;N ;!TD
l;S ) can only run a business in North, while those
with ! 2 [!TD
h;N;!TD
h;S) can adopt the high-productivity technology only in North.
Although the two threshold wealth levels, derived from the borrowing constraints, are
higher in South than in North, Southern entrepreneurs eectively gain access to Northern
credit market through FDI. Using  !S =  !N, we can therefore express the eective worldwide
credit-market clearing condition as
mN + mS
 !N
( !N   !h;N)gh +
mN + mS
 !N
(!h;N   !l;N)gl =
(mN + mS) !N
2
:
It is easy to see that this credit-market clearing condition is eectively equivalent to (14) for
k = N. Together with (41), it implies that !TD
h;N = !A
h;N and hence !TD
h;N = !T
h;N as Figure
3 shows since !T
h;N = !A
h;N. The productivity distribution in North would not be aected
by allowing FDI in addition to trade, nor would be in South, if we identify a rm by the



























l;N, we nd that RTD
W = RT
N. Allowing FDI in addi-
tion to trade will increase Southern interest rate, but will not change Northern interest rate
at all. Note that Northern rms have no (strong) incentive to move to South in equilibrium
because the interest rates are the same between the two countries.
29If international portfolio investment is also allowed in addition to FDI (and trade), capital
may move from South to North in the form of portfolio investment, to simply supply capital
to Northern credit-market in which credit demands have increased due to Southern rms'
FDI in North. That is, portfolio investment from South to North may replace Northern
rms' FDI in South. FDI may exacerbate the capital ight from South.
We record these ndings as the nal proposition.
Proposition 9 Reciprocal FDI will arise even when the countries engage in free trade. If
international portfolio investment is allowed in addition to trade and FDI, capital may move
from South to North in the form of portfolio investment, replacing Northern rms' FDI in
South.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the model where entrepreneurs with dierent wealth levels choose technology levels when
they enter a dierentiated-good sector, we have shown that rm heterogeneity in productivity
arises only if there exists nancial imperfection. We have also examined the impact of
international trade in goods and capital movement between two countries. We have found
among others that (i) trade in goods alone will not aect the productivity distribution of
the industry, (ii) capital tends to move from a wealthy country to the other and from a
country with a poorer nancial institution to the other, shrinking the industry in the source
country and expanding the industry in the host country, (iii) trade in goods aects the
productivity distribution in each country only when it is accompanied by capital movement,
(iv) when capital is also allowed to move, trade in goods itself induces capital movement
from South (with less wealth and/or with less-developed nancial institution) to North, and
(v) reciprocal FDI arises even in free trade.
These ndings regarding the impacts of nancial imperfection on the dierentiated-good
sector (which can be thought of as a manufacture industry) are in general quite dierent
from the conventional wisdom in international trade theory without any consideration of
nancial imperfection. Since no country has a perfect nancial institution in practice, it
30is important to know how the traditional theories should be modied when we incorporate
nancial imperfection into the models.
This paper is one of the rst attempts to investigate interactions between nancial devel-
opment and international trade, so there are many related topics to be explored. It would be
interesting, for example, to endogenize nancial development by incorporating political and
legal systems explicitly into the model. It would also be interesting to extend the model to
a dynamic one so that the wealth distribution, which has been shown to play an important
role in the analysis of this paper, is endogenously determined.
31Appendix
A A Cause of Financial Imperfection
Here, we present a simple model to justify an imperfect nancial institution. This model
setting is a simplied version of Tirole's (2006).
Let us consider the situation in which an agent tries to borrow g from a lender to nance
a protable project. This project potentially generates prots of (> Rg) where R is the
exogenous (gross) interest rate. In order to complete the project successfully with a high
probability, however, the agent must exert eort, which is unobservable to the lender. If
the agent exerts eort, the project generates  with the probability 1. If the agent shirks,
one the other hand, the project generates  with the probability pL(< 1) and 0 with the
probability 1 pL. By shirking, however, the agent can get non-pecuniary benets b, where
0 < b < 1.
The agent unambiguously shirks if the entire  goes to the lender. In order to induce
the agent to exert eort, therefore, the lender must abandon some of , giving a contingent
reward w to the agent; the reward is given to the agent if and only if the project has
successfully generated . The reward w should satisfy the incentive condition, w  pLw+b,
where the left-hand side is the agent's payo when she exerts eort, while the right-hand side
is her expected payo when she shirks. We assume that negative rewards (i.e., penalties) are
not allowed perhaps because the asset held by the agent is limited. This incentive condition




The lender expects to obtain at most [1  (b=(1 pL))] if he induces the agent to exert
eort. Alternatively, he may set w = 0 so that he obtains the expected payo of pL.









Obviously, the lender will not lend g if Rg exceeds . Note that if pL is small enough,  is
32equal to 1   (b=(1   pL)). Under a developed nancial institution with a solid legal system,
non-pecuniary benets tend to be small. The parameter  can be considered to represent
the quality of a nancial institution because  increases as b diminishes.
B Free Trade in Goods and Capital Movement under
Perfect Financial Institution
First, we derive the equilibrium prots and gross interest rate in free trade. Since trade
liberalization itself does not change the credit-market clearing condition in each country,
the number of rms in country k is still given by nk = mk !k=(2gh) as shown in (10).
Consequently, the competition index in country k can be written as
~ '









Despite the fact that the competition index increases as a result of trade as the comparison
between (12) and (42) reveals, rms' prots do not necessarily decrease because they are
now able to sell their products in both countries. The worldwide prots for any rm of any











(mN !N + mS !S)
: (43)
Then it follows from (9) that
RN = RS =
2(mN + mS)
(mN !N + mS !S)
: (44)
Both prots and interest rate in North rise and those in South fall as a result of trade,
equating the interest rates between the two countries and hence eliminating individuals'
incentive to invest abroad even when capital is allowed to move internationally.
If capital is internationally mobile while the good is not, capital moves from North to
South if  !N >  !S. The mass of rms decreases in North and increases in South until
the prots are equalized between the two countries. That is, it follows from k('h; ~ 'k) =
33mk=(nk) (as (13) shows) that mN=(nN) = mS=(nS). Together with the worldwide credit-
market clearing condition, described by













mS(mN !N + mS !S)
2gh(mN + mS)
:
Now, it is readily veried that N('h; ~ 'N) and S('h; ~ 'S) are both equal to W('h; ~ 'T) as
derived in (43), and as a consequence the interest rate RW in the world capital market will
be the same as RN and RS as derived in (44).
C Proof of Proposition 3
As  !k increases from gh, both !h;k and ^ !l;k(!h;k) decline to clear the credit market. This
change also reduces !h;k   ^ !l;k(!h;k) as we can see from (21), and eventually makes !h;k  
^ !l;k(!h;k) equal zero at a certain !h;k, which we call !0
h;k; !h;k > ^ !l;k(!h;k) if and only if the
equilibrium value of !h;k, i.e., !A
h;k, exceeds !0
h;k. We substitute ^ !l;k(!0
h;k) = !0










h;k (dened in (11)), there exists nonnegative excess credit supply when !h;k =
!0
h;k, in which case !A
h;k  !0
h;k so that the inequality !h;k > ^ !l;k(!h;k) does not hold. There-










for low-tech rms to exist in equilibrium. In other words, rm heterogeneity arises under
Assumption 3.
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Figure 3. Reciprocal FDI Flows 